In this paper we consider methods for sharing free text Twitter data, with the goal of protecting the privacy of individuals in the data while still releasing data that carries research value, i.e. minimizes risk and maximizes utility. We propose three protection methods: simple redaction of hashtags and twitter handles, an -differentially private Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer, and novel synthesis models based on a neural generative model. We evaluate these three methods using empirical measures of risk and utility. We define risk based on possible identification of users in the Twitter data, and we define utility based on two general language measures and two model-based tasks. We find that redaction maintains high utility for simple tasks but at the cost of high risk, while some neural synthesis models are able to produce higher levels of utility, even for more complicated tasks, while maintaining lower levels of risk. In practice, utility and risk present a trade-off, with some methods offering lower risk or higher utility. This work presents possible methods to approach the problem of privacy for free text and which methods could be used to meet different utility and risk thresholds.
Introduction
New technology and the dawn of the era of large-scale data has caused unstructured data such as natural language to become more frequently used and desired by researchers. One such source of text data is Twitter, which has become a very popular domain for social science research and machine learning applications. Along with the increased interest in this data type, many researchers now push for making results reproducible and data available for sharing [11] . While there are few established ethical guidelines as of yet for Twitter data, some researchers have argued explicitly that privacy must be maintained while sharing social media data [23, 29] . This requires us to answer the questions of what makes the data sensitive, what are the potential privacy losses that come from sharing such data, and what protection methods can best address this.
The field of statistical privacy, also sometimes referred to as statistical disclosure control, has produced numerous algorithms for enabling the public sharing of sensitive data while minimizing the risk of privacy loss to individuals in the data. Some well-known applications include the release of U.S. Census Bureau data [19, 12, 2] . While some traditional methods can be used to protect free text, the question of privacy for natural language records has not been researched specifically in the same way as traditional privacy preserving algorithms, and new algorithms can likely improve over traditional methods because both the nature of the data and the potential privacy issues differ from structured data. In this paper we define a specific privacy loss scenario for sharing Twitter data based on the identification of anonymized users in the released data, and consider methods to minimize this loss while maintaining research value of the shared data.
To compare the methods, we define empirical measures of privacy loss (risk) and research value (utility 1 ), and we evaluate each of our potential data releases using these measures. The releases include: (i) the original tweet corpus, which does not alter the free text at all, (ii) redaction of all twitter handles and hashtags in the text, (iii) full data synthesis using an -differentially private Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesis using varying levels of the privacy parameter, and (iv) full data synthesis using variations of a neural generative model.
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (i) defining a reasonable privacy loss scenario when sharing Twitter data, (ii) an empirical evaluation of differential private protection methods with respect to this scenario and the utility of the released data, and (iii) a novel synthesis model based on a generative neural architecture which is then compared with the traditional synthesis method. We find that the neural models produce higher utility than the traditional synthesis models for comparable levels of empirical risk. The redaction offers higher utility on simple utility tasks, but does not perform well on model-based utility tasks and carries higher risk. The rest of the paper is organized as such: Section 2 covers the three data release methods, Section 3 defines our risk scenario and our measure of privacy loss, Section 4 gives our utility measures for assessing research value of the released data, Section 5 presents empirical risk and utility results from an experiment using real Twitter data, and Section 6 gives conclusions and final remarks.
Data Release Methods
We pursue three approaches to free text privacy, redaction and two models for text synthesis, which constitute the methods for data release that we empirically evaluate. In this section, we describe the specific approaches we implemented as well as our proposed neural synthesis model.
Redaction for Disclosure Control
Redaction represents a common approach to protecting sensitive information in text, and it parallels concepts such as removal of direct identifiers or suppression of quasi-identifiers in tabular or microdata. Redaction has largely been used in protecting the privacy of medical or government documents [9] , and recent redaction research has focused on automated methods for redaction of text such as [5] , [6] , or [25] . Redaction relies upon the concept that text data is identifiable by key identifiers in the text which can be linked with external knowledge. These identifiers can be as simple as twitter handles or hashtags in the case of Twitter data, or they can be more sophisticated such as names of locations, companies, or individuals (i.e., named entities). In this paper we use only redaction of handles and hashtags, since it can be argued that these comprise the large majority of identifying entities in Twitter data. 2 
Multinomial-Dirichlet Synthesis Model
For a traditional synthesis method, we implement the Multinomial-Dirichlet (MD) synthesizer [1] , which utilizes a Bayesian framework to produce -differentially private synthetic count data. We use this as it is an established and actually implemented [19] method for releasing private synthetic data. This method combines the original method of synthetic data as proposed by [24] where draws are made from the Bayesian posterior predictive distribution (BPPD) with differentially private perturbation of the model parameters. Differential privacy is a formal definition of privacy which guarantees a specific form of privacy based on a tuneable privacy parameter. Formally, MD synthesis guarantees -differential privacy [7] , which is defined as follows:
For M , a randomized mechanism that takes a dataset as input and outputs a structure s ∈ R, where R is the range of M , if D andD are two adjacent datasets (with only one distinct entry), M is said to be ( )-differentially private if for all S ⊆ R we have:
In layman's terms, this definition means the absence or presence of a given record in the original data will not affect the algorithm output by more than a bound that is dependent on the privacy parameter . As increases, the bound increases and less privacy is offered. In practice this definition is achieved by adding noise to the algorithm which produces the output and generally larger values of mean adding less noise.
We utilize the MD synthesizer by representing our text as a Bag-of-Words (BOW), which splits the original text into a vector of counts for the number of times each term in the text occurs. In this way we can treat the tweets for each user as draws from a Multinomial distribution: BOW (tweets ij ) ∼ M ult(n j , π j ) where i is the tweet index, j is the user index, n j is the number of samples for a user, and π j is the term probabilities vector. We make one adaptation to the MD synthesizer, which is to synthesize each user independently rather than treating them as all coming from the same distribution. We do this to preserve the individual language of each user. There is a potential drawback to doing this, since individuals may share common language. The synthesizer works as follows:
.., X p ) be the term frequency vector, n j be the number of tweets, and j be the privacy parameter.
.., k to produceX, the release data.
Finally since each user is synthesized independently, we use the composition theorem of differential privacy, i.e. the overall privacy parameter = Σ k j=1 j . We choose to split evenly among the independent users. We can then choose to set the privacy for the combined release.
A Neural Synthesis Model
Motivated by recent successes of neural architectures in a variety of function approximation tasks [28, 13, 8, 16] , we propose an architecture for the task of text synthesization. Given a finite set of users (or authors) and a finite set of documents, we aim to model its unknown data generating process. In particular, to better capture temporal and structural information inherent in the data, given a finite, dictionary D, we hypothesize that, for input sequences like c = (c t , c t−1 , . . . , c t−m ), the distribution of interest is p(c t |y, c <t ), c t is a 1-of-|D| encoding of a symbol (either a character or token) at time t indexed in D. c <t is the symbol's history of length m − 1 and y is the index of the user to be associated with this encoded symbol. By learning a good generative model of this conditional distribution, we would then be able to generate valid symbol sequence samples representative of specific, target users (when clamping the model's "user" units to a particular index).
In order to learn from and generate sequences of symbols, one must account for the inherent temporal information (or rather, ordering of symbols). To this end, we design a recurrent neural architecture that specifically learns to model p(c t |y, c <t ). The architecture could be viewed as processing two parallel streams of encodings-a stream of symbols and a corresponding stream of user indices. The model predicts the symbol at time t using a vector summary of the past (i.e., its internal hidden state h t−1 ), the previously seen token at t − 1, and knowledge of the current user e y (also 1-of-k binary encoding). This model is fit to the target corpus we want to synthesize. As mentioned earlier, symbols could either be characters or words. The architecture, unfolded over 4 time steps, is shown in Figure 1 .
In contrast the one-model-per-user approach taken by the Multinomial-Dirichlet Synthesizer of Section 2.2, our model is designed to share several of its parameters across multiple views of the data, similar in spirit to the hybrid architectures of [22, 20, 21] or the log-linear models of [15] . In this way, we may construct a single model that learns userspecific parameters (equal to the number of latent variables in the internal layer) jointly with language model parameters (which aggregate knowledge across all document samples and users).
Our specialized neural architecture also addresses a recent problem found in neural conversation agents [27] . This issue centers around "coherence", where a trained neural model has no sense of identity or self (even at the crudest level). For example, if asked the question, "Are you married?", the model responds with "No!", but when followed up with the question "What is your wife's name?", the model might respond with, "Cynthia". While this issue is more prominent in sequence-to-sequence modeling tasks (as in question-answering, dialogue modeling), we also argue that in synthetic data-generation, where samples often come with meta-data, having a model that preserves local information such as user identity is crucial. We note that our work is not the only one that has attempted to address the coherence/consistency problem in neural models [26, 17] . However, our approach, while notably simpler in representing user-local information, differs in the ultimate goal of what is being modeled and the problem context (for example, our goal is simply to build a useful generative model, not a sequence-to-sequence mapper). 
Formally
where e y is the one-hot encoding of a user index y and (φ hid , φ out ) are the activation functions for input-to-hidden and hidden-to-output layers respectively. In this paper, for φ out we chose the softmax function for the parametrized posterior,
so that the outputs represent a valid probability distribution. Note that this single-hidden layer model is "deep in time" and can be easily made to be deep in structure (i.e., stacking more hidden layers). However, each hidden layer should sport a set of skip-connections to the user input layer, so that way all layer activations of the model are biased towards user-local distributed representations. Parameters of the model are fit to the data via stochastic gradient descent using truncated back-propagation through time to calculate parameter gradients (where m is used to control the length of the window, or number of steps back in time). The objective is to minimize the negative log likelihood of the predictive posterior of the sequence loss:
The parameters used to model individual users are also modified as part of the back-propagation-based procedure. Note that these learnt user "embeddings" could be useful for auxiliary tasks, such as clustering user representations together for similarity-search-based applications.
To generate samples from the neural model, we simply make use of the model's efficient inference procedure, similar to that in [10] . Specifically, by clamping the input units corresponding to a desired target user index and feeding in a "null" vector (or vector of all zeroes) as initial input, we may sample from its output probabilities and ultimately generate synthetic symbol sequences for individuals by feeding in a sample of model's predicted output back in as input for the next step. A sequence is continuously generated until either a simple end-token is generated (in our case this was a token in the set [., !?], or simple punctuation) or an upper bound on the character limit is reached (this is particularly useful for Twitter data, which naturally caps text at 140 characters).
Empirical Risk Measure
We define risk as the proportion of identifiable users in a released set of tweets. This emulates the situation where a researcher collects tweets and releases them along with the anonymized user labels after they have been made publicly unavailable (e.g. users deleted tweets, archived them, or exceeded the number of historically available tweets). In this scenario, a malicious party tries to identify specific users in the released data and accordingly learn which tweets belong to this user. If this occurs, it would be a breach of privacy because non-public information is disclosed about individuals, but it is also easy to imagine a situation where the privacy risk is increased through additional information generated from the research. For example, consider a study using sentiment analysis to assign sensitive attributes such as 'violent' or 'racist'. If these results were attributed to tweets which were then shared, and it were possible to link these tweets back to specific users, it would be a serious intrusion of privacy.
To measure this identification risk we use machine learning techniques under the following setting. For each release data set R (i.e. the original, redacted or synthesized data), there is a set of n tweets and k users to whom the tweets belong tweet ij ∈ R, i = 1, ..., n j j = 1, ..., k where i indicates the tweet index and j indicates the user index. We assume the potential attacker has compiled a data set with publicly available tweets of the set of user or users q ∈ Q she wants to identify (henceforth A). Note that this is done for simplicity, but in practice the attacker could collect any set of documents which he knows includes some composed by the targeted individuals. For the targeted users in A the attacker trains a set of binary classifiers, f q , to separate tweets by these users from tweets by all other users 3 . Lastly we assume for simplicity that the targeted individuals are actually present in the released data. It is unlikely that this would always be the case, but this assumption gives an upper bound on the measure since risk would be lower if the targeted individuals were not present in the released data.
We next use the trained classifiers f q for a given user q to assign each f q (tweet i ) = 1 if it was produced by q and 0 otherwise. For each user j in R we get the proportion of tweets that where classified positively to q out of the total number of the user's tweets:
The best guess for the identity of targeted user q is then the user j that has the highest value of 4, i.e. the highest proportion of positively classified tweets. If this best guess is correct, i.e. j == q, it is a true positive, otherwise it is a false positive. We do this for each user in A, and the overall privacy loss for the release is the proportion of true positives, or the proportion of correctly identified users. An example of the output of this algorithm is visualized in Figure 2 for a sample of four attacked users.
This formulation of risk differs from a common risk concept, which relies on linking released records with other publicly available data. In this case, we assume the tweets are not publicly available, so the data cannot be linked. Instead, users are identified by their language compared with other publicly available documents which they have produced. This framework sets the bar higher in some ways for the protection required by expanding the set of identifiers from direct IDs and named entities to natural language. One potential weakness is that our method is fully based on machine learning techniques, so it rules out identification by way of inside knowledge, e.g. knowing a user has a unique favorite hashtag. Alternative risk scenarios exist and may be affected differently by our protection methods, but we use this setup as it is easy to interpret and imagine occurring in a real-world setting.
Empirical Utility Measures
To measure research value of each data release, what we will refer to as utility, we implement four measures. The first measures similarity of uni-grams between the original (baseline) tweets and the tweets in a given data release. Unigrams are simply the individual terms or words used in the tweets after the text has been tokenized. We calculate a vector of uni-grams (counts of terms) for each user in the baseline data and the data releases (recall our tweets include anonymized user labels), and estimate the cosine similarity between the baseline and each release vector. Cosine similarity is defined as:
for two vectors x and y. We then take the average cosine similarity across all users for a given data release and use this as our utility measure.
The second measure is similar to the first, but it estimates bi-gram similarity rather than uni-gram. Bi-grams, as the name suggests, are the combinations of two sequential terms used in the tweets. We again calculate these vectors for each user and estimate the average cosine similarity of users to the baseline for a given data release.
The third measure compares user sentiment between the baseline and data releases. We first train a sentiment model, based on IMDB movie reviews published by [18] . We train a binary (positive/negative) classifier (linear SVM). We then use this model to assign each tweet an affect and then each user an average affect. We get a vector of average user af-fects for the baseline and each data release, and we compute the average cosine similarity between sentiment of users in the baseline and a given data release.
The fourth measure considers a classification task to detect the use of a specific hashtag in tweets. This utility measure is based on the study for which the original data was collected. The goal of which was to differentiate between supporters of different anti-immigrant groups on Twitter (see Section 5) . A machine learning model is trained to detect the use of a hashtag (#bluehand) from the BOW representation of the plain text of the tweet (with the hashtag removed). This is done for the baseline and each data release. The utility measure is the f1-score of the classifier, defined as:
f1-score = precision * recall precision + recall
Experimental Results
We test our release methods using a sample of Twitter data that was collected in the context of a study on antiimmigration sentiment, so tweets were gathered if they contained at least one from a set of hashtags. We construct a hypothetical release data set, consisting of 5364 tweets (413 unique users) and an attacker data set consisting of 4387 tweets (414 users), such that all users in the release are present in the attack. This allows us to estimate risk as described in section 3.
Training the Neural Synthesizer
The release sample of tweets were used to learn the parameters of the generative model. We experimented with several variants of the basic architecture, primarily changing φ hid , where function candidates included the logistic sigmoid φ(v) = 1/(1 + e −v ), the linear rectifier φ(v) = max(0, v), and the softsign φ(v) = v/(1 + |v|). 4 Other meta-parameter settings explored included the hidden layer size, [50, 100, 200], the learning rate, [0.1, 0.01, 0.001], and the variance of the centered Gaussian distributions used to initialize the input-to-hidden, hidden-to-output, and recurrent weight matrices, [0.1, 0.25, 0.5] (except in the case of rectifier and softsign units-recurrent weights were initialized to a scaled identity matrix as in [14] ). Over 50 epochs, parameter optimization was performed using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with mini-batches of size 50 (when applicable, no zero-padding was used, so sequences of length less than m were used as separate sample updates). Truncated back-propagation through time was used to estimate parameter gradients, (window size m = 10). We also experimented with a simple adaptive learning rate scheme, RMSProp (with decay set to 0.95). All gradients were clipped to the magnitude range of [−1, 1]. All the words in the Twitter sample vocabulary (5978 words total) were used to construct the feature dictionary.
Risk and Utility Results
We evaluate our redaction and synthesis methods on this data using the risk and utility measures detailed in sections 3 and 4. We produce one data release using redaction, removing all hashtags and twitter handles. We produce 21 data releases using the MD synthesizer from section 2.2 with different values of ranging from [0.1, 10000]. We produce 6 data releases using variations of neural models as given in section 2.3. The results are visualized in Figure 3 using a utilityrisk plot and results are listed in Table 1 . In each case, the baseline is at highest point both for utility and risk, which in the panels of Figure 3 is the top right corner. The top left quadrant of each graph is the most desirable position, i.e. highest utility and lowest risk.
We chose to produce numerous -differentially private data releases in order to approximate the empirical trade-off curve between risk and utility as the value of changes. As the values increase, we see the curve shift towards more utility but also greater risk. We also see, as we should given the definition of -differential privacy, a roughly logarithmic relationship between and risk. This relationship is not deterministic, since there is also randomness in the synthesis process. For this reason we fit a curve to the MD synthesis results as shown in Figure 3 .
It is important to note that -differential privacy guarantees proveable protection for a specific definition of privacy, but we are interested here in evaluating its protection on our empirical measure of risk (in addition to utility). In addition to understanding how -differential privacy relates to our risk measure, we are particularly interested to use this as a way to compare our neural synthesis models. While we are careful to note that the neural models do not offer differential privacy guarantees, we observe where they fall on the risk curve for our empirical risk measure. Given that risk is different for free text data, comparing the neural models with the differentially private models on an empirical measure allows us to get an idea of the protection offered by the neural models.
The choice of the best release method depends on the desired point on the utility-risk curve. In terms of empirical risk, we find that the neural synthesis models fall roughly between the MD synthesizer with between [0. 1, 750] . On all but the sentiment utility task, the neural methods produce better utility for similar levels of risk as compared with the MD synthesizer. The uni-grams utility is perhaps the most general statistic, measuring how well the release Figure 3 : Utility plotted against risk for the different data releases. The blue curve is a curve fit only to the MD synthesizer outputs, and gives the empirical risk-utility curve as increases. The exact values are labeled, and the neural synthesis, redaction, and baseline outputs are given in the legend. A different utility measure is used in each with the same risk measure. models maintained the language of each user. The bi-grams and classification task utility show much higher utility for the neural models as expected, since these synthesis models maintain sequence while the MD synthesizer does not. This is clearly a strength of this approach. The redaction approach preserves high utility for sentiment and bi-gram similarity, but at the cost of much higher risk. It performs worse on uni-grams, likely because there are many hashtags and those are redacted, and it is unable to even attempt the classification task because the goal of the classification (#bluehand) is redacted. This highlights one of the weaknesses of using redacted data for actual research tasks.
In terms of results, the sentiment utility appears different from the other three. One reason for this could be that the sentiment analysis task of assigning affect to users could have performed poorly on the baseline data. This would explain why all release methods have very high utility (cosine similarity) because they also perform poorly. The sentiment model might perform poorly, even on the baseline data because this tweet corpus was collected based on anti-islamic hashtags and the sentiment model was trained using IMDB movie reviews. There is likely poor overlap between these corpuses' language. It is interesting that the strongest neural models were produced using the softsign activation function, inspired by the work of [3] . For comparable levels of risk, these models offer the most utility across three of the four measures, and performance might yet still be further improved by employing quadratic filters. We note that it is surprising the RMSProp optimizer underperformed simple SGD, but this could be due to lack of proper tuning of the decay hyper-parameter.
Overall, the softsign models prove promising in terms of keeping risk low while producing higher levels of utility. The softsign proved to be the most effective activation function in our experiments, but we largely speculate that this is due to the fact that this nonlinearity does saturate as easily facilitating more effective optimization of parameters (but avoiding the instability issues related to a partially unbounded function like the rectifier). This stands in contrast to hard-clipped functions, like sigmoidal non-linearities (including the hyperbolic tangent).
Conclusions
This works presents both an empirical study of protection for unstructured text data and new methods for achieving this using a neural-based approach. The standard methods, redaction and the MD synthesizer perform generally as we expected, and we find that some of the neural models are able to produce a higher level of utility while maintaining a low level of risk. Importantly they outperform simple redaction both in terms of minimizing the risk of identification of users in the text and performing some more in-depth utility tasks. Further work should improve upon these synthesis models, which will only increase their appeal as protection mechanisms. Our neural models presented here are a simple first pass, but already show that they can outperform some traditional methods. In particular we find the softsign-RNN model to be the most promising.
The use of any of these methods in a real data release scenario would depend on the level of the desired level of risk and utility. These must be set using domain knowledge and an assessment of the seriousness of any privacy violations. This work is a step towards understanding what methods exist to approach the problem of privacy for free text and which methods should be used for a given utility-risk location.
Our use of Twitter data presented some issues for training the language models, and these models should improve with a larger corpus of test data or different text data with more complete grammatical structure. Regardless, our results perform well, and this work should be easily extendable to other social media data. Protection of social media data to enable further sharing of research data while maintaining privacy of the individuals in the data is a key step towards ensuring participant trust, reproducible research, and a strong foundation for future research.
